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The Leonard Jeffries Problem: Public University
Professor/Administrators, Controversial Speech, and
Constitutional Protection for Public Employees
Michael J. Sherman*
Leonard Jeffries, a tenured professor at the City University of New
York ("CUNY"), is well known for his outspoken anti-Semitism.
Jeffries first attracted widespread attention after newspapers reported
remarks that he made at a state-subsidized Empire State Black Arts and
Cultural Festival in Albany on July 20, 1991.' Jeffries alleged "a
conspiracy, planned and plotted and programmed out of Hollywood,
where people [were] named Greenberg and Weisberg ... and what
not."2 Jeffries also accused "rich Jews" of conspiring with the Mafia
to "put together a system [for the] destruction of black people."3 After
these speeches drew attention to Jeffries and to CUNY, the
university's Board of Trustees decided to reduce Jeffries' new term as
the Black Studies Department Chairman to one year rather than the
customary appointment of three years.4 Jeffries sued, claiming that the
university's action violated his First Amendment rights.5 Jeffries
ultimately lost.6
CUNY never attempted to fire Jeffries from his position as a tenured
faculty member; the legal fight was solely over Jeffries' administrative
* Ph.D. candidate, University of Michigan, Department of Political Science; J.D.
1997, M.A. 1994, University of Michigan; A.B. 1991, University of Chicago. Many
thanks to Professor Mark Brandon for his help in preparing this article, and to Paula
Denney and Professor Terrance Sandalow for their helpful comments.
1. See Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238, 1241 (2d Cir. 1994), aff'g in part and
vacating in part 828 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), vacated and remanded, 513 U.S.
996 (1994), and rev'd, 52 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1995). Jeffries' speech concentrated on his
perception of biases against minorities in the public schools. See Jeffries, 21 F.3d at
1242.
2. Vivienne Walt, Cuomo in CUNY Fray Supports Action Against 2 Profs over Racial
Views, NEWSDAY, August 9, 1991, at 3, available in 1991 WL 4023476 (stating that the
conspiracy was to denigrate African people in the movies).
3. Jeffries, 21 F.3d at 1242. In addition, Jeffries referred to a supporter of the public
school curriculum as the "ultimate, supreme, sophisticated, debonair racist." Id.
4. See id. at 1241.
5. See id. at 1243. Jeffries sued Harleston and the members of the Board of Trustees.
See id.
6. See Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 15 (2d Cir. 1995) (concluding that Jeffries
was not deprived of his constitutional rights).
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position.7 This article specifically addresses the constitutionality of the
action that the university took: What free speech rights do public
university professors have with regard to their roles as administrators?
Does the right to free speech operate differently when a professor is
acting in his role as a professor rather than that of an administrator?
This article argues that when evaluating suits by public employees over
free expression claims, courts should first consider the nature of the
job the public employee-plaintiff holds. If the employee's job requires
freedom of thought and dissemination of ideas, then the protection
accorded the employee should be quite high and, correspondingly, the
power of the government to punish this employee for expressing her
ideas should be relatively low. If, on the other hand, the job is one
where acceptable performance does not necessitate such freedoms,
then a "disruptiveness" standard may be more appropriate. Under this
analysis, the First Amendment rights of university professors should
be very high while the rights of administrators can be relatively low.
Additionally, this article will argue that a public university can separate
administrative from professorial functions in its relations with an
individual who plays both these roles.8 This distinction would allow a
public university to take disciplinary action with regard to an
employee's administrative role that is not appropriate with regard to his
professorial role.
Part I will discuss prior cases that have addressed the general issue
of free speech rights of public employees 9 and then discuss the Jeffries
litigation in greater detail.' ° The standard proposed by this article
represents a switch from prior jurisprudence in this area that has
tended to focus exclusively on the nature of the speech in question,
and not the nature of the employee. Part II will draw an analogy
between professors and judges and the level of protection required for
adequate performance for each job." Under this analysis, professors
require a high degree of free speech protection for reasons that are
similar to the reasons judges require immunity for actions taken in their
official capacity. 2 Part III will suggest a professor/administrator
distinction in free speech protection that is analogous to the different
levels of immunity granted to judges acting in their judicial capacity
7. See Jeffries, 21 F.3d at 1243.
8. See infra Part I.B.2.
9. See infra Part I.A.
10. See infra Part I.B.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part II.B.
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and judges acting in non-judicial roles. 3 Just as this distinction allows
suits against judges for actions taken outside the realm of their judicial
roles, it allows universities to take actions against professors as
administrators that would not be acceptable if taken against the
professor acting as a professor.'n
I. BACKGROUND
A. Public Employees and the First Amendment
If employee Smith tells her fellow employees that she thinks the
boss is a rat, or if she writes a letter to the local paper expressing this
view, she can probably expect to lose her job. Most employees in the
United States are at-will employees, and even an employer who must
show "just cause" to fire an employee, has justification by labeling
"demeaning talk" as insubordination or a disruption of the efficient
running of the office. Under these circumstances, if Smith is fired she
will certainly not prevail in a lawsuit against her employer claiming
violation of free speech rights. But what if the employer in this case is
the government? Shouldn't the First Amendment prevent the
government from punishing the employee for expressing her opinion?
On the other hand, doesn't the government, like any employer, have
an interest in promoting efficiency in the office? Is the government
really barred from taking action against an insubordinate or disruptive
employee?
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in a series of cases, three
of which are outlined below. 5 The Court has held that while the
government as employer can act to preserve interests it has in common
with private employers, public employees retain at least some of their
First Amendment rights.' 6 In deciding these cases, the Court has
tended to focus almost exclusively on the nature of the speech in
question, rather than the nature of the job performed by the employee
in question.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part III.B. This article focuses primarily on claims to academic freedom
that can be made by university professors. It should be noted, however, that universities
may themselves lay claim to an institutional form of academic freedom. See infra notes
196-203 and accompanying text (explaining how a university can raise a claim of
academic freedom).
15. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138
(1983); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). The Waters decision came
down after the original Jeffries decision by the Second Circuit.
16. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 682; Connick, 461 U.S. at 154; Pickering, 391 U.S. at
573-75.
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In Pickering v. Board of Education,7 petitioner Pickering was a
high school teacher who was fired after he wrote a letter to a local
newspaper that criticized the school board and the superintendent's
performance on revenue issues. 8 Before being fired, Pickering was
granted a hearing, and he was fired pursuant to an Illinois statute that
permitted such action when the "interests of the school [so]
require[d]."' 9 In its opinion, the Court recognized that "the State has
interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that
differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with
regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general. 2 ° On the other
hand, the Court noted that the idea that "teachers may constitutionally
be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would
otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in
connection with the operation of the public schools in which they
work," had been unanimously rejected.2' The Court observed that
Pickering's letter was about not just any matter of public concern, but
about school spending policies.22 Because of their close connection to
the schools, the Court maintained that it was "essential" for teachers to
be able to voice their opinions about such matters.23
However, even if this had not been the case, Pickering's speech
would have implicated free speech concerns not because he was a
teacher, but simply because he was a public employee. Justice
Marshall's majority opinion explained that "[t]his Court has . . .
indicated ... that statements by public officials on matters of public
concern must be accorded First Amendment protection despite the fact
that the statements are directed at their nominal superiors.,, 24 Thus,
while the Court did not completely ignore the nature of Pickering's
particular public sector job, the analysis suggests that it was not
determinative either.25 Had Pickering been a public employee but not a
17. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), rev'g 225 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1967).
18. See id. at 564.
19. Id. at 564-65.
20. Id. at 568.
21. Id. (citing the following cases as examples in which a teacher's First Amendment
rights were protected: Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)).
22. See id. at 569-70.
23. See id. at 572.
24. Id. at 574. An additional element in Pickering was that Pickering's letter
contained allegedly false charges. See id. at 566. Because of this, at least part of the
Court's ruling in favor of Pickering was tied to an application of the libel standard of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See id. at 574.
25. See id. (concluding that the Court was disinclined "to make an across-the-board
equation of dismissal from public employment for remarks critical of superiors with
654 [Vol. 30
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teacher, the Court likely would have attempted to balance the interests
of his rights to comment on public issues against the State's interest in
promoting efficiency.26
An additional element in Pickering was that Pickering's letter
contained allegedly false charges. 27 Because of this, at least part of the
Court's ruling in favor of Pickering was tied to an application of the
libel standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.28 Aside from the
issue of free speech rights for public employees, the Court was able to
hold for Pickering on the narrower ground that a teacher speaking on a
matter of public importance could not be fired "absent proof of false
statements knowingly or recklessly made by him."'29 The logic of the
Court's analysis contained implications beyond the scope of the
particular facts before it. Additionally, the Court mentioned prior
cases that had held that "statements by public officials on matters of
public concern must be accorded First Amendment protection despite
the fact that the statements are directed at their nominal superiors."3
However, the Court did not use Pickering to explicitly establish a more
general rule for the free speech rights of public employees or the extent
of the government's power to fire an employee for engaging in First
Amendment activity that interfered with the operation of that
employee's office. 3 That analysis would wait for Connick v.
awarding damages in libel suit by a public official for similar criticism").
26. See id. at 568-71. In making this analysis, the Court bore in mind that
Pickering's letter was "in no way directed towards any person with whom appellant
would normally be in contact in the course of his daily work as a teacher," and that there
was "no question of maintaining either discipline by immediate superiors or harmony
among coworkers ...presented." Id. at 569-70. These are not considerations that
would be relevant only in the context of a teacher, as opposed to other public
employees. Furthermore, Justice Marshall remarked that his majority opinion was
"evaluating the conflicting claims of First Amendment protection and the need for
orderly school administration in the context of this case[J" Id. at 569 (emphasis added).
This indicates that, to the extent that the Court's opinion focuses on the fact that
Pickering was a teacher, it was not because his status as a teacher necessitated analysis
different from the analysis that would have been required had he had a different public
sector job, but rather that it focused on his role as a teacher because that was part of the
facts presented to the Court. See id. There is nothing to suggest that similar logic would
not have been applied had Pickering not been a teacher. See supra note 25 and
accompanying text (establishing that Pickering's job was not a determinative factor).
27. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566-67.
28. See id. at 573 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 2.
29. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574. Again, this was not because of any special status
afforded to Pickering because he was a teacher. In fact, quite the opposite was true. The
Court held that for purposes of libel analysis Pickering was to be considered a "member
of the general public." Id.
30. Id.
3 1. See id.
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Myers.32
Harry Connick, Sr. was the District Attorney for Orleans Parish in
Louisiana and Sheila Myers was an assistant District Attorney working
under Connick.33 Upset after being told that she was being
transferred, Myers wrote and distributed a questionnaire to several
other assistant district attorneys.34 The questionnaire concerned a
whole range of issues including office morale, office transfer policy,
and whether workers ever felt pressured to work in political
campaigns. 35 Feeling that Myers' actions constituted insubordination,
Connick fired her.3 6 Myers sued in federal court and won; the lower
courts held that the firing was illegal under Pickering because Myers'
speech was on "matters of public importance and concern."37
The Supreme Court reversed.38 Writing for the Court, Justice
White held that the lower courts had misapplied Pickering by holding
that any speech that related to the efficient operation of a government
office (in this case the District Attorney's office) was for that reason
speech "of public importance and concern."39  Instead, Myers'
questionnaire concerned mere "internal office matters." 4 The lower
court's view could not be upheld because "government offices could
not function if every employment decision became a constitutional
matter., 41 Under such a standard any discussion about the workings
of a government office would considered speech of public interest and
.concern protected under the Pickering standard.
The Court was careful to make clear that it was not suggesting that
the speech at issue was wholly without First Amendment protection,
or that it was in the same category as well-known forms of low-value
speech such as obscenity or fighting words.42 Instead, "when a public
32. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), rev'g 507 F. Supp. 752 (E.D. La. 1981)
and 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981).
33. See id. at 140 (establishing that Myers worked in the office for five and a half
years).
34. See id. at 141.
35. See id.
36. See id. Prior to being fired, Myers told Connick she would consider the transfer.
See id.
37. Id. at 143 (quoting Myers, 507 F. Supp. at 758).
3 8. See id. at 154. The Court held in favor of Connick in a five-four decision. See id.
at 139. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented. See id. at 156-
70.
39. Id. at 143.
40. See id.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 147 ("The First Amendment does not protect speech and assembly only
to the extent it can be characterized as political.") (internal citation omitted).
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employee speaks ... as an employee upon matters only of personal
interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not
the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel
decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the
employee's behavior. 4 3 The Court, however, did not rule that speech
by a public employee would never be protected under the Pickering
standard." Instead, deciding whether a public employee's speech
merited such protection would require taking into account the "content,
form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole
record."45 Even if the speech in question met this standard, it would
still need to be balanced against the "government's interest in the
effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities to the public."
Such balancing would take into account Pickering's requirement that
the "state's burden in justifying a particular discharge varies depending
upon the nature of the employee's expression."47 Applying this
standard, the Court upheld Connick's decision to fire Myers, even
though it recognized that one of the questions in the questionnaire
addressed a matter of public concern.48 The firing was acceptable in
spite of this because "[w]hen close working relationships are essential
to fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the
employer's judgment is appropriate."49
In a case decided after the Second Circuit's initial decision in
Jeffries, the Supreme Court supplemented the Pickering/Connick test
in Waters v. Churchill.5 ° Cheryl Churchill was fired from her job as a
nurse at a public hospital for allegedly making comments that were
critical of certain hospital policies and her supervisors.51 Churchill
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 147-48.
46. Id. at 150. The Court noted that the government had a "legitimate purpose in
promot[ing] efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties." Id. at 150-51
(internal citation omitted).
47. Id. at 150.
48. See id. at 154. Question 11 asked "Do you ever feel pressured to work in political
campaigns on behalf of office candidates?" Id. at 155.
49. Id. at 151-52. Of course, the public interest/government efficiency standard has
not lacked critics. See Edward J. Velazquez, Comment, Waters v. Churchill:
Government-Employer Efficiency, Judicial Deference, and the Abandonment of Public-
Employee Free Speech by the Supreme Court, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 1055 passim (1995)
(arguing that the public interest/government efficiency standard is insufficiently
solicitous of the free speech rights of public employees).
50. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994), vacating 977 F.2d 1114 (7th Cir.
1992).
5 1. See id. at 664-66. Churchill received a negative evaluation from her supervisors
that indicated that Churchill "promote[d] an unpleasant atmosphere and hinders
1999] 657
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
disputed her supervisors' account of the conversation in question.52
Subsequently, the hospital won a partial grant of summary judgment in
district court.53 The district court ruled that regardless of whose
version of Churchill's comments was correct, the speech was not
about a matter of public concern and was therefore not protected.
54
The ruling was reversed on appeal.55 The Seventh Circuit held that
Churchill's version of her comments did qualify as speech on a matter
of public concern and was protected under Connick.56 Because
Churchill's speech was not disruptive, the hospital had fired her
illegally.57 Significantly, the Seventh Circuit also ruled that the inquiry
into what Churchill said had to hinge on what Churchill actually said,
and not on what the hospital thought she said.58 If the hospital's
determination of Churchill's comments turned out to be mistaken, then
the hospital could be held responsible for its error and would be
required to rectify it.59
The Supreme Court Vacated and remanded the case.60 Justice
O'Connor's plurality opinion held that if a supervisor wanted to fire an
employee for comments made in a situation in which a "reasonable
supervisor would recognize.., a substantial likelihood that what was
said was actually protected, the manager must tread with a certain
amount of care."'" The plurality was clear, however, that it would
give managers in this situation a certain amount of leeway in making
these determinations.62 The manager's care need not reach the level
required of an attorney during a trial using the rules of evidence. 63 The
manager should use that reasonable care required in employment
decisions of this sort.64 The "reasonable care" required should not be
limited to a specific course of action and should conform to the
situation.65 Accordingly, a manager should be liable only if his or her
constructive communication and cooperation." Id. at 665 (internal citation omitted).
52. See id. at 666. Churchill admitted to criticizing a hospital vice-president but
asserted her support for her supervisor. See id.
53. See id. at 667.
54. See id. (citing Churchill, 977 F.2d at 1119-20).
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 667-68.
60. See id. at 682.
61. Id. at 677.
62. See id. at 677-78.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 678.
65. See id. (stating that many different courses of action can be considered
658 [Vol. 30
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actions do not fall within the range of those considered reasonable.'
Applying this standard, the plurality held that the hospital had made
a reasonable effort to inquire into what Churchill had actually said even
if this effort may have produced an erroneous outcome.6 7
Furthermore, given Churchill's alleged comments, the hospital had
ample reason to believe that Churchill's continued presence on the job
threatened to disrupt the hospital's operations.68 Thus, even if her
speech was on a matter of public concern-an issue that the plurality
did not reach-the hospital's act of firing Churchill was within the
range of reasonable behavior because the potential disruption
outweighed her free speech rights.69
B. The Jeffries Litigation
The controversy surrounding Professor Jeffries began after Jeffries
gave an off-campus speech on education reform that included implicit
and overt anti-Semitic comments.7° When news reports of the speech
reached campus, CUNY President Bernard Harleston initiated a
review of Jeffries as chairperson of the Black Studies Department.7'
Fearing negative repercussions, the Board of Trustees voted to reduce
Jeffries' term as department chairman from three years to one year.72
Jeffries' suit claimed the action violated his First Amendment rights.73
1. The District Court
The case was initially litigated in the Southern District of New
York. 74 The district court made two points that are relevant to the
discussion here. First, in applying the Pickering/Connick test, the
court stated that the government must show that an employee's speech
"reasonable").
66. See id. (recognizing that different managers will disagree on the exact course of
action to take).
67. See id. at 680 (noting that time constraints limited the investigation).
68. See id. at 680-81 (noting that the person who heard the comments felt they were
"unkind and inappropriate").
69. See id. at 680-82. The Court did, however, remand the case to the Court of
Appeals because it held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
hospital had fired Churchill for the reasons stated or whether there were other motives
involved. See id.
70. See Jeffries v. Harleston, 828 F. Supp. 1066, 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd in part
and vacated in part, 21 F.3d 1238, 1241 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded, 513 U.S.
996 (1994), and rev'd, 52 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1995).
7 1. See id. at 1073-74.
72. See id. at 1075.
73. See id. at 1077.
74. See id. at 1066.
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actually interfered with the operation of the office before the
government can discharge an employee for speech that involves a
matter of public concern.75 In making this ruling, the district court
relied on a Supreme Court case in which the Court had ruled that an
employee could not be fired over a statement on a matter of public
concern because the government employer lacked evidence that the
employee's comment had interfered with office operations.76
Secondly, the district court rejected the defense's argument that even
if the university was aware that its actions would not have been
acceptable if a mere professor was involved, CUNY should not have
been expected to know that similar actions would also be unacceptable
when taken against a departmental chairperson, who had "greater
responsibility" and a position "higher up in the academic hierarchy. 77
In rejecting this argument, the court relied on Piesco v. City of New
York, Dept. of Personnel,78 in which the Second Circuit had applied
Connick in spite of the plaintiff's high government position.79
Because, the district court reasoned, Piesco's position8 ° was much
higher in the governmental hierarchy than was Jeffries', his "high
government position" was clearly not enough to make the Connick
standard inapplicable to this suit.8 Based on the reasoning in Piesco,
the district court noted that Jeffries' higher position did not give the
government license to retaliate against him for his speech.8 2 The
distinction between departmental chair and professor is significant, but
not for the "high government position" reason argued by the defense at
this stage of the proceedings.83
After losing in the Southern District, CUNY appealed to the Second
Circuit.84 The Second Circuit upheld the lower court ruling on the
issues discussed above. 85 The court reversed the award of punitive
damages and remanded to the district court for a new trial solely on
75. See id. at 1089.
76. See id. (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1987)).
77. Id. at 1088.
78. Piesco v. City of New York, Dept. of Personnel, 933 F.2d 1149 (2d Cir. 1991).
79. See Jeffries, 828 F. Supp. at 1086-89 (citing Piesco, 933 F.2d at 1151-61).
80. Judith Piesco was Deputy Personnel Director for Examinations in the New York
City Department of Personnel. See Piesco, 933 F.2d at 1151.
8 1. See Jeffries, 828 F. Supp. at 1088.
82. See id. at 1088-89.
83. See infra Part 1I.B (discussing the distinction between professors and academic
administrators).
84. See Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238, 1238 (2d Cir. 1994).
85. See id. at 1250.
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*86this issue. The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, which
remanded the' case to the Second Circuit for further consideration in
light of the Court's recent holding in Waters v. Churchill.
8 7
2. The Second Circuit on Remand
The Second Circuit ruled that the university's actions were justified
in light of its legitimate fear that Jeffries' outspoken anti-Semitism
"would disrupt university operations." 8  The Second Circuit's
decision reflected the view of a plurality of the Supreme Court in
Waters v. Churchill.89 The court had to resolve what counted as
"disruptiveness." 90 The Second Circuit noted that "[o]ne of the
principles driving our earlier Jeffries decision was that the First
Amendment protects a government employee who speaks out on
issues of public interest ... unless the speech actually disrupted the
employer's operations." 91 The court noted that this was the Second
Circuit rule set forth in Piesco.92 The court read Waters as holding that
the governmental employer did not need to show actual interference,
but rather a "substantial showing of likely interference." 93 Because the
original district court jury found that a majority of the Jeffries
defendants had acted out of a "reasonable expectation" that Jeffries'
Albany speech would harm the university, the decision to shorten
Jeffries' term as department chairperson was not unconstitutional. 94
Rather than focusing solely on Jeffries' potential for "disruption,"
the court should also have focused-at least initially-on the different
nature of his First Amendment rights as a university administrator, and
the greater discretion this gave CUNY to legally shorten his tenure as
department head.95 Thus, while a university may not interfere with a
86. See id.
87. See Harleston v. Jeffries, 513 U.S. 996, 996 (1994) (vacating the Second
Circuit's ruling and remanding for further consideration in light of Waters); supra notes
50-69 and accompanying text for a thorough discussion of Waters.
88. See Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 10 (2d Cir. 1995).
89. See id. at 13.
90. See id. at 13-14.
91. Id. at 12 (citation omitted).
92. See id.
93. Id. at 13 (citation omitted).
94. See id. at 13-14.
95. The "purpose of the job" standard proposed by this article may not solve every
conceivable question in this area. Public employees work in an extremely broad range
of occupations, and it may not always be clear how to "rank" a particular occupation on
this scale (and, needless to say, it would be well beyond the scope of this article to
attempt to rank all or even most such occupations). However, some important
distinctions can be made-such as that, as this article discusses, professors acting as
1999]
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professor's professorial duties because of speech the university finds
objectionable, that same university may limit or eliminate altogether a
professor's administrative role because of that same speech by relying
on the "disruptiveness" standard.96
II. WHY PROTECT PROFESSORS?
The nature of academic jobs requires heightened protection of First
Amendment rights relative to other public employees, but this
heightened protection requirement should not extend to administrative
positions. This claim is similar to arguments made in support of
immunity from suit for judges acting within their official capacities.
Just as a judge cannot be expected to perform her job effectively if she
is forced to operate under threat of suit from unhappy litigants, a
professor cannot be expected to perform her job effectively if she is
forced to work under threat of punishment for expressing her views. 97
professors rank at or near the top of this scale-and that if courts attempt to apply this
standard it will represent a significant improvement in jurisprudence in this area over
just using the "disruptive" standard (which, it need hardly be said, is not itself exactly an
objective, easy to apply standard). For different approaches to the problems raised by
the Jeffries scenario, see Harry F. Tepker, Jr. & Joseph Harroz, Jr., On Balancing Scales,
Kaleidoscopes, and the Blurred Limits of Academic Freedom, 50 OKLA. L. REv. 1, 32-43
(1997) (recommending an inquiry into whether the restricted speaker has experienced an
"undue burden"); Rachel E. Fugate, Comment, Choppy Waters Are Forecast For Academic
Free Speech, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 187, 213-17 (1998) (recommending an academic
standard allowing content restrictions only in the event that a speech's secondary
effects were targets of the regulation).
96. To be clear, this standard applies regardless of where the "objectionable" speech
occurred. In the case of Leonard Jeffries, his anti-Semitic comments did not occur in the
classroom, but even if they had, this standard would still have allowed CUNY to remove
him from his administrative role but not from his position on the faculty. At the same
time, universities have attempted to impose limitations on professors' classroom
activities because of the interests of students, particularly in cases involving alleged
sexual harassment. See, e.g., Silva v. University of N.H., 888 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.H.
1994) (involving a professor who was disciplined for using sexually explicit imagery in
a writing class). This article does not claim that sexual harassment law is always
unconstitutional as applied to a professor or that a professor's classroom conduct should
not be subject to limitations. Rather, this article maintains that different interests are
implicated when an academic's professorial duties are curtailed than are implicated when
the same individual's administrative role is at stake. For a discussion of hostile
environment claims by university students, see Timothy E. Di Domenico, Comment,
Silva v. University of N.H.: The Precarious Balance Between Student Hostile
Environment Claims and Academic Freedom, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 609, 619-31 (1995)
(discussing hostile environment claims in the context of academic freedom); Donna
Prokop, Note, Controversial Teacher Speech: Striking a Balance Between First
Amendment Rights and Educational Interests, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2533, 2568-77 (1993)
(discussing the weighing of student interests against teacher's free speech rights).
97. In an article connected to a symposium on federal judicial independence, Judge
James Zagel and Adam Winkler have argued that judicial independence and academic
freedom are not at all similar in their operation. See James Zagel and Adam Winkler, The
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A. The Judicial Immunity Analogy
The Supreme Court has long recognized that judges are immune
from suit where the alleged wrong arises out of action taken by a judge
acting in her official capacity.9 This is a doctrine that dates back more
than a century. 99 In recent years, the Court has applied this doctrine to
suits brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871,100 even where a
judge was accused of acting maliciously,'' and even in a case where a
judge issued an order to sterilize a 15-year-old girl without the girl's
knowledge or consent. 10 2 As the Court noted in Bradley v. Fisher,103
judicial immunity is a doctrine taken from English common law.'04
The Court cited English cases that explained that judicial immunity was
a doctrine that served to benefit not just judges, but the public as well,
which has an interest in judges being able to perform their jobs without
fear of lawsuits. l ' Similarly, the Court in Stump v. Sparkman10
6
rejected arguments that a suit against an Indiana circuit court judge
should be allowed because of the "tragic consequences" of the judge's
action, arguing that "[t]he fact that the issue before the judge is a
controversial one is all the more reason that he should be able to act
without fear of suit,"'0 7 since such immunity was in the "best interests
of 'the proper administration of justice."" 8 These cases establish two
defenses for judicial immunity. First, immunity is required to allow
judges the freedom to make decisions on controversial matters. 109
Independence of Judges, 46 MERCER L. REV 795, 806-812 (1995) (discussing the
differences between judicial discretion and academic speech). While their arguments are
well taken, they do not contradict the claim I am making here, which is that the reasons
that judges and academics require a high level of "immunity"-that it is a sine qua non
for them to fulfill their professional obligations-are similar, even if academic freedom
and judicial independence do not look the same in practice.
98. See, e.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 passim (1872) (affirming a jury verdict
for the defense in a suit brought against a judge who barred a lawyer from practicing in
the judge's court); Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) 523 passim (1868) (affirming a
state court dismissal of a suit against a judge that alleged wrongful removal from the
state bar).
99. See Bradley, 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 335; Randall, 74 U.S. (I Wall.) at 523.
100. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) (holding that the judicial
immunity doctrine is not abolished by 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
101. See id. at 554.
102. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978).
103. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) 335 (1872).
104. See id. at 349.
105. See id. at 349-50.
106. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
107. Id. at 363-64.
108. Id. at 363 (quoting Bradley, 80 U.S. (I Wall.) at 347).
109. See id. at 363-64.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Second, the public has a strong interest in maintaining this protection
for judges.1 0
B. Academic Freedom as "Immunity"
Analogous arguments apply with equal force to giving professors
"immunity" or academic freedom so that they may fulfill their
professional responsibilities: the pursuit of knowledge through the
testing of and exchange of ideas."1 l Just as judges are supposed to
apply the law independent of personal biases in order to reach a just
outcome, professors are supposed to search for truth and to expand
existing bodies of knowledge independent of governmental pressure to
reach particular results. This also requires being free from threat of
sanction from people who dislike the professor's ideas.112
During the McCarthy era, academics, like people from many walks
of life, were subject to extreme political pressure, accusations, and
blacklists.1 3 Professors from a variety of different universities lost
jobs or were subject to other sanctions in the course of McCarthy
hysteria.114 The result was perhaps predictable: self-censorship. '15 A
1955 study that involved over 2,000 academics revealed that many
admitted being "scared" by the McCarthy era purges and that more
110. See Bradley, 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 349-50.
111. This argument assumes that the importance of professors pursuing knowledge is
on a par with the importance of judicial independence. See infra notes 122-29 and
accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's recognition of the importance of
academic freedom).
112. In this sense, "immunity" for professors is more analogous to judicial immunity
than it is to legislative immunity. While legislators are in some sense protected so that
they can be free to reach the "best" outcome, they are also subject to potential
"sanctions" from their constituents, who are free-perhaps even encouraged-to put
political pressure on a legislator even when the legislator claims to be acting in the
public interest. Judges, even those who are elected and are therefore potentially subject
to political pressure, are not thought to represent constituents in the same manner. See
Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453, 455 (M.D. La. 1972) (refusing to apply one-
person/one-vote standards to judicial elections because "j]udges do not represent
people, they serve people," and are therefore entitled to greater protection even when
reaching unpopular results). Obviously, this is even more true of appointed judges. See
also AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, GENERAL REPORT OF THE
COMMIITEE ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC TENURE 26 (1915), reprinted in THE
AMERICAN CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN FORMATION 26 (Walter P. Metzger, ed.,
1977) (hereinafter GENERAL REPORT) (comparing the relationship between university
trustees and university professors to that between presidents and the federal judges they
appoint).
113. See ELLEN W. SCHRECKER, No IVORY TOWER 10 (1986).
114. See generally id. at 161-282 (discussing the impact and effects of McCarthyism
on the academic community)
115. See id. at 309.
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than a quarter admitted to "some form of political self-censorship."' 16
A similar number of those surveyed said that if they were to face a
politically motivated charge, they would not expect support from their
colleagues." 7 Given this level of fear, it is certainly worth wondering
what work was not undertaken, what questions were not investigated
by university faculty, and how much academia suffered because of
outside political pressures.
The McCarthy era may be unique in the extreme level of political
pressure applied to professors and the resulting interference with
academic work. Still, today it is not unheard of for professors to
restrict their work in response to outside pressure. Professors may
simply decide to stop teaching classes because of political pressure.'18
Furthermore, political pressures keep people who espouse certain
views from being hired at all-a scenario that seems frighteningly
similar to McCarthy era events." 9 The unsurprising consequence of
outside pressure is that not only do academics fail to teach classes in
"controversial" areas, they turn away from certain fields altogether. 2 0
As with the effect of the McCarthy-era purges, it is hard to quantify
what is lost, or what is not learned or discovered. Nonetheless, it is
hardly bold to claim that the negative consequences are considerable
for educators in general, and therefore for the country as a whole.'21
If professors are too scared to ask difficult questions or to make
"unpleasant" arguments, education suffers.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that academic freedom is a
vital interest protected by the First Amendment. In so noting, the
Court has made clear that the reason academic freedom is so crucial is
because of its connection to the ability of academics to fulfill their
responsibilities of pursuing knowledge.' 22 This, in turn, is vital
because of its importance to the country as a whole.'23 In Barenblatt
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. See NAT HENTOFF, FREE SPEECH FOR ME-BUT NOT FOR THEE 152 (1992); see also
DINESH D'SOUZA, ILLIBERAL EDUCATION 148-51, 194-97 (1991) (providing examples of
professors censored at the University of Michigan and Harvard University).
119. See D'SouzA, supra note 118, at 212 (discussing feminism and its impact on
professors desiring to teach women's study courses); see also Thomas Sowell, Do
Colleges Indoctrinate or Educate?, ALBANY TIMES-UNION, Feb. 26, 1997, at A7, available
in 1997 WL 3483869.
1 20. See D'SOUZA, supra note 118, at 248.
121. See infra notes 173-85 and accompanying text (discussing a report issued by the
American Association of University Professors which argued that professors should be
free to inquire and publish without fear of reprisal for unpopular work).
122. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959).
123. See id.
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v. United States, though the Court upheld Congress' right to question
petitioner Barenblatt about supposed Communist party affiliations
during his time as a graduate student, Justice Harlan's majority
opinion emphasized that the First Amendment protected academic
freedom.1 24 Justice Harlan stated that the Court needs to be a bulwark
against invasions of academic freedom, at least in part because of the
vital interests at stake in allowing professors to meet their obliga-
tions. He explained:
[Ilnquiries cannot be made into the teaching that is pursued in
any of our educational institutions. When academic teaching-
freedom and its corollary learning-freedom, so essential to the
well-being of the Nation, are claimed, this Court will always be
on the alert against intrusion by Congress into this
constitutionally protected domain.
1 26
Justice Black, in dissent, expressed dismay at the decision because of
its impact on academic freedom: "This result, whose importance
cannot be overestimated, is doubly crucial when it affects the univer-
sities, on which we must largely rely for the experimentation and
development of new ideas essential to our country's welfare.' 27
Expanding on this theme, the Court has also pointed out that the
benefits of academic freedom extend far beyond the protection given to
the individual professors protected by this doctrine. 128 The Court has
recognized the nation's commitment to safeguarding academic freedom
not only for the teachers concerned, but because of its value for all its
citizens. 129 The Court in Keyishian v. Board of Regents also
recognized that academics should not be kept from pursuing even
124. Id. at 112.
125. See id.
126. Id. The Court went on to state that these essential freedoms would not prevent
Congress from interrogating a witness just because he was a teacher. See id. The Court
commented that "[a]n educational institution is not a constitutional sanctuary from
inquiring into matters that may otherwise be within the constitutional legislative
domain merely for the reason that inquiry is made of someone within its walls." Id.
127. Id. at 144 (Black, J., dissenting).
128. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
129. See id. In Keyishian, certain faculty members of the State University of New
York refused to sign "loyalty" certificates concerning whether they held communist
beliefs. See id. at 592. The Court held that the New York statutes and regulations, which
were designed to prevent "subversive" persons from obtaining state employment, were
unconstitutional. See id. at 592-93. The Court stated in part:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.
Id. at 603.
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controversial topics. 3 ° "The Nation's future depends upon leaders
trained through-wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through
any kind of authoritative selection. '"1 31 This view reflected Chief
Justice Warren's plurality opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, in
which the Chief Justice wrote:
To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our
colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation
.... Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion
and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to
inquire, to study, and to evaluate .. .otherwise our civilization
will stagnate and die.' 3
2
These statements make clear how seriously the Court takes the
protection of academic freedom and how vital the interests at stake are.
Thus, it is quite evident that the "immunity" of academic freedom is
required for professors to be able to function effectively and that there
are serious consequences when this freedom is invaded. It is also
unmistakable that the Supreme Court believes one of its functions is to
serve as a protector for those whose academic "immunity" is
threatened.
III. THE LIMITS ON IMMUNITY
A. Immunity is not Applied Across the Board
In its rulings on immunity for government officials-judges,
legislators, and executive officials-the Court has established two
separate, though related, principles. First, the Court has ruled that
whether immunity applies in a given situation depends not upon the
individual's office, but the function being performed.'33 Second, in an
extension of the first point, immunity does not apply where a judge,
legislator, or executive official performs a non-judicial, legislative, or
executive function.134 This is true even if the function in question is
central to the operation of his role that has given rise to the grant of
immunity. '
130. See id.
131. Id. (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943)).
132. Id. at 250 (holding that a teacher's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights
were violated when he was adjudged guilty of contempt of court for refusing to answer
questions on, inter alia, his lectures at the University of New Hampshire).
133. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511 (1978).
134. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227-28 (1988).
135. See id. at 228.
1999] 667
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
In Butz v. Economou,136 Arthur Economou sued officials in the
Department of Agriculture for damages, claiming that they had initiated
an investigation and an administrative proceeding against him in
retaliation for his criticism of the Agency.137 The defendants claimed
that they were immune from such suits. 3 ' The Supreme Court held
that executive branch officials were not entitled to absolute immunity
from damage actions under all circumstances, noting that this "would
seriously erode the protection provided by basic constitutional
guarantees."'' 39 However, the Court held that such officials were
entitled to absolute immunity when acting in a judicial capacity. 4 °
Justice White's majority opinion explained that the Court of Appeals
had placed too much emphasis on the fact that the government officials
who had been sued were employees of the Executive Branch. 41 He
went on to state "Ij]udges have absolute immunity not because of their
particular location within the Government but because of the special
nature of their responsibilities.' 42 Because judges are entitled to
absolute immunity for actions within their judicial capacity, 43
executive branch officials who perform adjudicative functions within a
federal agency are entitled to absolute immunity for such actions
because the process is similar enough to the judicial process to warrant
"judicial-like" immunity. 44
Among immunities given to government officials, judicial immunity
is the most analogous to academic freedom. As a result, it is with this
type of immunity that this article is most concerned. However, it is
worth pointing out that the Supreme Court has had occasion to make
rulings on the immunity to be afforded government officials in all
branches of government. 141 In each of these cases, regardless of the
office or branch involved, a threshold inquiry has been whether the
officials in question were acting within the capacity that entitled them
136. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
137. See id. at 480.
138. See id. at 483.
139. Id. at 505.
140. See id. at 514.
141. See id. at 511.
142. Id. at 511.
143. See id. at 508-10; see also supra Part II.A (discussing judicial immunity).
144. See Butz, 438 U.S. at 512-14.
145. See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (involving a state
prosecuting attorney); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (involving public
school officials), Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (involving various members
of the executive branch of a state government); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367
(1951) (involving a member of a state legislature).
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to immunity. 146
As the previous section discussed, the Supreme Court has given a
generous level of immunity to judges acting in their judicial
capacities. 47 Judicial immunity, however, is not boundless. The
Court has chosen not to extend this immunity to judges when they
have been sued for actions taken outside their judicial functions. This
rule has applied in a number of different cases. The Court in Ex Parte
Virginia 4 permitted a criminal indictment issued against a state judge
who was accused of excluding blacks from juries. The Court first
argued that the role of selecting jurors was not a judicial act, arguing
that "[t]he duty of selecting jurors might as well have been committed
to a private person as to one holding the office of a judge."' 49 The
Court further argued that even if this were not true, and if selecting
jurors could be considered a judicial act, a judge could not consider
conduct that violated the law, such as excluding jurors on the basis of
their race, to be action taken within his judicial capacity. 5 '
In 1980, the Supreme Court ruled that state judges were not entitled
to judicial immunity for activities connected to their promulgation of a
state code of professional responsibility.' The Court ruled that such
activity was not judicial in character because compiling a code involved
rulemaking and not adjudication.'52 In doing so, the Court relied on
the separate opinion of one member of the three-judge district court
that had heard the case initially.'53 The Court agreed with the
distinction made that "[d]isciplinary rules are rules of general
application and are statutory in character .... They do not arise out of
a controversy which must be adjudicated, but instead out of a need to
regulate conduct . . . "'.5 The Court also agreed with the lower
court's conclusion that, when the Supreme Court enacted disciplinary
146. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430; Wood, 420 U.S. at 321; Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 247-
48; Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377-78.
147. See supra Part II.A (discussing judicial immunity).
148. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
149. Id. at 348.
150. See id. at 348-49. An analogous argument could be made that conduct by
professors that violates the law (such as sexual harassment) is not activity undertaken
within a professor's official capacity. See supra notes 17-31 and accompanying text
(discussing Pickering, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), which involved the firing of a teacher after
he wrote a letter critical of the school's superintendent).
151. See Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the United States, 446 U.S.
719, 739 (1980).
152. See id. at 731.
153. See id. (citing Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n,
470 F. Supp. 1055 (E.D. Va. 1979)).
154. Id. at 731 (quoting Consumers Union, 470 F. Supp. at 1064).
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rules, it was acting as a legislative rather than a judicial body. 55
More recently, in Forrester v. White, 5 6 the Court refused to grant
immunity to a judge who was sued in a section 1983 action for
allegedly demoting and dismissing a probation officer on account of
her gender, in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 57 In so ruling, the Court reviewed the aforementioned
cases that established that absolute immunity for judges does not
extend to non-judicial acts.' 58 The Court further observed that
"[a]dministrative decisions, even though they may be essential to the
very functioning of the courts, have not.. . been regarded as judicial
acts."' 5 9 In addressing the specific fact scenario involved, Justice
O'Connor wrote:
In the case before us, we think it clear that Judge White was
acting in an administrative capacity when he demoted and
discharged Forrester. Those acts-like many others involved in
supervising court employees and overseeing the efficient
operation of a court-may have been quite important in
providing the necessary conditions of a sound adjudicative
system. The decisions at issue, however, were not themselves
judicial or adjudicative . . . . [A] judge who hires or fires a
probation officer cannot meaningfully be distinguished from a
district attorney who hires and fires assistant district attorneys, or
indeed from any other Executive Branch official who is
responsible for making such employment decisions. Such
decisions, like personnel decisions made by judges, are often
crucial to the efficient operation of public institutions ... yet no
one suggests that they give rise to absolute immunity from
liability in damages under § 1983.160
Because the judge was not acting "judicially," he was not immune
from suit.' 6' The next section will argue that, just as cases have
distinguished between judges acting in judicial and non-judicial
capacities, a similar distinction can and should be made between
academics acting in a professorial manner and academics acting in
administrative roles.
155. See id. The Court ruled, however, that the Virginia Supreme Court was entitled
to legislative immunity with regard to its role as issuer of the disciplinary code. See id.
at 733-34.
156. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988).
157. See id. at 230.
158. See id. at 228-29 (citations omitted).
159. Id. at 228.
160. Id. at 229.
161. See id. at 230.
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B. Professors Acting as Administrators Need Not Be Immune
In addition to their roles as teachers and researchers, professors may
serve in a variety of administrative capacities. Some of these roles-
such as being a department chairperson or head of a department
committee-may be taken on in addition to regular professorial duties.
Other roles, such as being a university president, may be complete
jobs in themselves, leaving little or no time for work as a "regular"
professor. In either situation, administrative duties, even those that
may be extremely important to the teaching and researching
enterprises, differ from strictly educational responsibilities. Most
notably, administrative duties do not demand the same level of
academic freedom and should therefore receive different treatment
under the Constitution.
In order to understand why this is the case, we should again
consider the reasons, as outlined above, for the various immunities
from suit that the Court has given. Immunities are necessary because
the person-or rather the office-in question cannot function without
some sort of protection. As the Court noted in Pierson v. Ray, 62
judges require absolute immunity for actions taken in their official
capacity because "[i]mposing such a burden on judges [the fear of
lawsuits by unsuccessful litigants] would contribute not to principled
and fearless decisionmaking but to intimidation." 163 Or, as the Court
stated in Randall v. Brigham,164 "[t]o secure the maximum of
impartiality, a judge must be protected from personal responsibility for
his errors. ... 165 To hold otherwise, and to allow suits by unhappy
litigants would be "to offer a bounty on dissent."' 166 Obviously,
"principled and fearless decisionmaking"'' 67 and "the maximum of
impartiality"'' 68 are desirable qualities in judges, while a perverse
disincentive brought about by a "bounty on dissent" is not. Thus,
immunity is granted for judicial acts. However, certain other functions
162. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
163. Id. at 554.
164. Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) 523 (1868).
165. Id. at 533. The Court stated:
It would be absurd to say that he should receive protection of the law only in
those cases where no protection is required. Accordingly, for more than five
hundred years, by a uniform series of decisions, judges have been held exempt
from personal responsibility for their judicial words and acts.
Id.
166. Id. at 534.
167. See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554.
168. See Randall, 74 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 533.
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that may be performed by judges, such as picking jurors, 169 hiring and
firing court personnel, 170 or promulgating a code of professional
responsibility,17' can be separated from the parts of a judge's job that
require "principled and fearless decisionmaking" and "the maximum of
impartiality." Because these duties may be separated, allowing suits
for tortious actions taken while pursuing these tasks does not threaten
these desired judicial qualities that we seek to preserve. Hence,
immunity is not granted for actions in these roles. This is true even
though some of the actions for which suit is allowed involves activities
that are "essential to the very functioning of the courts."'7 2
As discussed earlier, professors require "immunity," or academic
freedom to allow them to perform the function that we wish them to
perform. Professors should be free to add to the body of scholarly
knowledge without fear of reprisals for unpopular or controversial
work. In 1915, a committee of the American Association of Univer-
sity Professors (AAUP) issued a report on academic freedom. 173 In
this report, the committee, which included such luminaries as Arthur
Lovejoy and Roscoe Pound, 174 argued that "[t]he importance of
academic freedom is most clearly perceived in the light of the purposes
for which universities exist."' 7 5 The committee listed three such
purposes: (1) promoting inquiry and advancing knowledge; (2)
instructing students; and (3) developing experts for public service. 17 6
With regard to the first of these goals, the committee declared that "the
first condition of progress is complete and unlimited freedom to pursue
inquiry and publish its results.' 77 Academic freedom was thought to
be equally important in the classroom because:
No man can be a successful teacher unless he enjoys the respect
of his students, and their confidence in his intellectual integrity
.... [T]his confidence will be impaired if there is suspicion on
169. See Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1879).
170. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988).
171. See Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the United States, 446 U.S.
719, 739 (1980).
172. Forrester, 484 U.S. at 228. There are, of course, cases in which judicial
immunity does not apply because it is clear that the actions taken by the judge were not
even remotely central to the functioning of a court. See Zarcone v. Perry, 572 F.2d 52,
53 (2d Cir. 1978) In Zarcone, the Second Circuit upheld a damage award against a traffic
court judge who ordered that a vendor be handcuffed and brought in front of the judge
because the vendor sold coffee that the judge thought tasted "putrid." See id. at 53.
173. See GENERAL REPORT, supra note 112.
174. See id. at 43.
175. Id. at 27.
176. See id.
177. Id. at 28.
672 [Vol. 30
The Leonard Jeffries Problem
the part of the student that the teacher is not expressing himself
fully or frankly, or that college and universit 8 teachers in
general are a repressed and intimidated class ....
Finally, in order to be of service to the community, "[i]t is obvious that
: , * the scholar must be absolutely free not only to pursue his
investigations but to declare the results of his researches, no matter
where they may lead him or to what extent they may come into conflict
with accepted opinion."'179 Just as judges are given immunity because
the judiciary could not function properly otherwise,180 academics
require protection from reprisals for their academic work because the
university could not serve its mission otherwise.
Two points stand out from this report. First, the report makes clear
the paramount importance of unrestricted academic freedom for the
intellectual pursuits of a professor. Second, the report does not
mention a necessity for freedom from review for administrative tasks.
Part II of the committee's report makes several policy proposals. The
first of these calls for judicial bodies to be convened before university
teachers-but not administrators-are fired or disciplined.18' The
reason such bodies are required is "[t]o safeguard freedom of inquiry
and of teaching against both covert and overt attacks." '182 Again, it is
the academic and not the administrative role that must be protected.
Similarly, a 1940 report of the AAUP states that "[t]he teacher is
entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the
results,"' 83 and that "[t]he teacher is entitled to freedom in the
classroom in discussing his subject."' 84 Again, there is no mention of
a similar need to protect those serving in administrative roles. One
might argue that an organization such as the AAUP would be more
inclined to concern itself with professorial duties. However, because
professors frequently fill administrative roles at universities, the
178. Id.
179. Id. at 29.
180. See supra Part II.A (discussing judicial immunity). The Supreme Court stated:
It is a principle of our law that no action will lie against a judge of one of the
superior courts for a judicial act . . . . The public are deeply interested in this
rule, which indeed exists for their benefit, and was established in order to
secure the independence of the judges and prevent them from being harassed by
any vexatious action . ...
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (I Wall.) 335, 349 (1871) (internal citations omitted).
181. See GENERAL REPORT, supra note 112, at 40.
182. Id.
183. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND
TENURE, 1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND INTERPRETIVE COMMENTS 2, reprinted in THE
AMERICAN CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN FORMATION (Walter P. Metzger, ed., 1977).
184. Id.
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AAUP might well have spoken up about the need for administrative
immunity if it felt that such roles demanded similar protection. While
it can be problematic to interpret the meaning of inaction, the absence
of such statements on behalf of administrators, or on behalf of
professors acting as administrators, should at a minimum tell us that
this was not an issue at the forefront of the AAUP's agenda.185
In the textbook An Introduction to Educational Administration, Emil
Hailer and Kenneth Strike remark that their research revealed that
"teachers were generally most willing to accept the authority of
administrators over 'administrivia' and least willing to accept their
authority over the things that really matter, such as curriculum and
teaching."'1 86 This view is
tantamount to seeing the administrator as a servant of teachers
rather than supervisor of teachers. The administrator is the
person who is responsible to see to it that .. .the teacher has
available the resources that are necessary to teach. It is not,
however, the responsibility of the administrator to interfere with
the professional judgment of the teacher with respect to central
educational decisions.187
They claim that this "is precisely the view of administration that is held
by many university professors,' ' 188 and that this view is "(arguably)
more appropriate to a university context than to [the pre-college setting
they are concerned with]."' 189 This description helps to make clear the
reason that administrative roles do not require immunity: these roles,
and the duties they entail, are not part of promoting inquiry, expanding
existing bodies of knowledge, or of classroom instruction.'90
This is not to say that administrative tasks are trivial or unnecessary.
Indeed, a university needs competent administrators in order to run
smoothly. In its immunity rulings, however, the Supreme Court has
differentiated between actions that are immunized because they are part
of the official's actual job, and actions that are not immunized because
they are not part of that actual job. The Court has maintained this
185. Perhaps an AAUP report that calls for a high level of protection for professors
can be seen as self-serving. However, if that is true, the absence of a call for similarly
strong protection of administrative roles is even more striking. If this group did not
feel that it needed to call for academic freedom protection for administrative roles, the
claim that such protection is required seems particularly weak.
186. EMIL J. HALLER & KENNETH A. STRIKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO EDUCATIONAL
ADMINISTRATION 47 (1986).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See supra notes 173-85 and accompanying text (discussing the 1915 AAUP
Report on the challenges of academia).
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distinction even where the non-immunized actions have been central to
the functions of the official for which immunity is granted.19' A
similar distinction is appropriate in the academic arena. If applied
correctly, professors should be given "judicial-like immunity" (i.e.
academic freedom) for actions taken as professors that serve the goals
of the university as set out above, 192 but are not entitled to a similar
degree of immunity for their administrative actions.'93 Helping to
facilitate inquiry is not the same as engaging in the inquiry itself.
Finally, there is the issue of claims to "institutional" academic
freedom that may be raised by a university. The Supreme Court has
recognized these claims. For example, in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, Justice Powell's opinion that held that it was
191. See supra notes 156-161 and accompanying text (discussing Forrester and the
Court's refusal to immunize a judge acting in a non-judicial role). Furthermore, though
administrative jobs at universities may frequently be filled by academics, they do not
have to be in every instance. There is nothing inherent in the role of university
administrator that requires that the position be filled by someone who operates under a
grant of immunity. This was also true of the tasks performed by the judges who were the
subject of the suits in Ex Parte Virginia and Forrester v. White. See supra notes 148-50,
156-60 and accompanying text (discussing the holdings of Ex Parte Virginia and
Forrester v. White).
192. See supra notes 175-76 and accompanying text (listing the purposes of
universities).
193. Subsequent to the end of the Jeffries litigation, a panel of the Sixth Circuit
issued a ruling that turned at least in part on distinguishing between university jobs that
require protection of academic freedom and those that do not. See Dambrot v. Central
Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1189-90 (6th Cir. 1995). In Dambrot, the court upheld
Central Michigan University's (CMU) firing of its men's basketball coach, who had
used a racial epithet during a locker room discussion with his players, despite the fact
that the court ruled the University's anti-discriminatory harassment policy was
unconstitutional. See id. at 1193. Judge Keith's unanimous opinion noted that
Dambrot's job was not one that implicated academic freedom concerns. See id. at 1189-
90. The court stated:
Dambrot's use of the N-word is even further away from the . . . concept of
academic freedom because his position as coach is somewhat different from
that of the average classroom teacher. Unlike the classroom teacher whose
primary role is to guide students through the discussion and debate of various
viewpoints in a particular discipline, Dambrot's role as a coach is to train his
student athletes how to win on the court. The plays and strategies are seldom
up for debate ... Moreover, [there is] a disincentive on any debate with the
coach's ideas ....
Id. at 1190.
We cannot be sure if the ruling would have been the same if Coach Dambrot had held a
position as an "average classroom teacher." However, the logic of the decision suggests
that had Dambrot been a tenured professor at CMU in addition to his duties as men's
basketball coach, the university could still have fired him from his coaching position
for the conduct in question even if it could not have fired him from his professorial
position, though it is also possible that a professor's use of a racial epithet in class
might be actionable under a hostile environment claim.
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acceptable for the university to take race into account in admission
decisions relied on the university's right to academic freedom, as
manifested here through its decision that a racially diverse student
body would be beneficial to the school.'94 Justice Powell relied on
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, in which the Court referred approvingly to an academic
address that maintained that universities must be free to "determine...
on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall
be taught, and who may be admitted to study."1 95
Certainly institutional claims to academic freedom can conflict with
the individual claims of a professor.' 96 These circumstances may
make for hard cases. As this article has demonstrated, however, if the
professor is acting as an administrator, claims of academic freedom are
demonstrably weaker. Thus, to the extent that a university may make
institutional academic freedom claims, the university should be in a
relatively stronger position. A university's claims to institutional
academic freedom are implicated most frequently with regard to hiring
and tenure decisions, 197 but one can easily imagine claims it might
make with regard to the job status of an administrator. Just as a
university might make a decision to fill jobs in certain areas and not
others, or to maintain programs in some disciplines and not in
others,198 a university might decide that a particular chairperson was
leading a department down an unsatisfactory or injurious path and that
194. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
195. Id. at 312 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957)). For
scholarly discussions of institutional academic freedom, see Judith Jarvis Thomson,
Ideology and Faculty Selection, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 155
(discussing the role ideology should play in the hiring of faculty); David M. Rabban, A
Functional Analysis of "Individual" and "Institutional" Academic Freedom Under the
First Amendment, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 227 (discussing tension
between the AAUP view of academic freedom which stresses freedom of individual faculty
members and the Supreme Court decisions about freedom of institutions from state
interferences).
196. See Rabban, supra note 195, at 280-300.
197. See Thomson, supra note 195; Rabban, supra note 195, at 266-280.
198. Obviously, these decisions may well have ideological components to them.
However, it seems that there is a difference between a university or a department deciding
what types of experts it would like to have on the faculty and that same university or
department sanctioning a current member of the faculty because of the content of that
faculty member's ideas. Furthermore, a claim that a professor should be free to pursue
her work free of threats from those who dislike her conclusions does not mean that same
professor has a similar right as a dean or department chair to take an entire school or
department in the directions she chooses, without any input from the university. At a
minimum, institutional academic freedom would seem to allow for a university to have
some input into the broad directions its academic departments take in their pursuit of
knowledge.
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the university should be free to take corrective action.
The Second Circuit held that CUNY could legitimately take action
because Jeffries'-the chair, and therefore public representative of the
Black Studies department-vocal anti-Semitism threatened university
operations.' 99 What type of "threat" might Jeffries have posed?
CUNY might have felt that Jeffries was hurting the University in two
ways. CUNY might have felt that Jeffries, as chair, was likely to lead
the department in an undesirable direction in the eyes of the university.
Their concern over the direction he was leading his department would
constitute "internal" damage to a department in its ability to provide a
good Black Studies department.2 °° The university could also claim
that having a vocal and well-known anti-Semite in such a public
position would damage CUNY's ability to provide any educational
services efficiently. This would constitute "external" damage to the
school.2 1 The university could legitimately consider either or both
types of damage in making a decision on whether to remove Jeffries
from his administrative post.20 2  Institutional academic freedom
suggests that a university should have at least some and perhaps a
great deal of leeway to make such determinations. 23
199. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (noting that CUNY argued Jeffries'
discussion of "widespread conspiracy" at a state subsidized lecture "would disrupt
university operations").
200. A claim such as this one might have both ideological and non-ideological
components to it. CUNY might have felt that having Jeffries as chair threatened its
ability to attract competent scholars of any ideological bent to the Black Studies
department. Conversely, it might also have felt that Jeffries' comments were a sign of a
type of "scholarship" that CUNY did not want to support by having Jeffries in the
influential position of departmental chair.
201. This seems to be fairly close to the claim that CUNY actually made. See supra
note 88 and accompanying text (noting that CUNY thought Jeffries might harm the
university's reputation).
202. This is not meant to suggest that a university may automatically rid itself of any
administrator who happens to be a professor whose views some find objectionable. The
disruptiveness standard should not be simply a rubber stamp for government employers.
In Jeffries' case, CUNY was in the position to argue that the extreme amount of negative
publicity that Jeffries' comments caused did constitute an important interference with
University operations as a whole. However, given that most employees of a university
are not well-known to the public at large (with the possible exception of a few sports
coaches), a university will most likely have a hard time claiming that ostensibly
controversial comments made by a particular employee does much "external" damage.
Similarly, a claim of "internal" damage caused by controversial comments may often be
hard to sustain when the employee's comments are placed against the backdrop of
intellectual cacophony that is commonplace in university communities.
203. Relying on the "disruptiveness" standard, as CUNY and the courts ultimately
did, does not distinguish CUNY from other employers (such as the hospital in Waters)
that might not have available claims to "institutional" academic freedom. While
allowing CUNY to discipline a "disruptive" departmental chair implies some freedom to
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IV. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, in ruling in favor of CUNY, the Second Circuit reached
the correct result. The university acted within its legitimate bound of
authority when it disciplined Professor Jeffries in his role as
department chair. Unfortunately, the court reached the right outcome
for the wrong reason. The court should not have focused on the
supposed "disruptiveness" of Jeffries' anti-Semitic remarks, at least
not initially. Instead, the court should have focused on the nature of
the disciplinary action taken against Jeffries. If CUNY had sanctioned
Jeffries in his professorial capacity, then the fact that Jeffries' speech
was "disruptive" would not, standing alone, have been an acceptable
defense. Professors need the freedom to be "disruptive" in order to
perform their jobs properly. However, because the university acted
against Jeffries in his administrative capacity, rather than in his
professorial capacity, the university's actions did not implicate
Jeffries' "professorial immunity." While this is not to say that public
university administrators (or nurses at public hospitals, or assistant
district attorneys) are completely without First Amendment protection,
the lack of a similarly compelling reason for "administrative immunity"
means that CUNY could properly take account of Jeffries'
disruptiveness, or of other harm he was causing the university. As a
result, administrator Jeffries did not have a valid claim.
make judgments about "disruptiveness" by CUNY, the disruptiveness standard gives
leeway to all public employers to make such judgments.
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